IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.

AMUNHOTEP EL BEY, etc., al. CASE NO's: **98-823-CFB**
(Plaintiffs)
VS. **562004CT005567**
OFFICER HARRIS, PSL PD, (2004-2005) **2005CT002801**
JOSEPH SMITH, Clerk of Court, (2004-present day) **562007CF4217**
JOANNE HOLMAN, Clerk of Court, (1998-2004) **2007TR043187 A1**
19TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (1998-present day) **2007TR043182 A1**
MICHAEL J.KESSLER, Attorney, (1998-1999) **11CA2316**
STEVEN J. LEVIN, Former, ASA, now a Judge, (1998-1999) **2010MM001552 A**
DWIGHT L. GEIGER, Judge, (1998-1999) USD JUDGE: **12-CV-14201-JEM**
WADE WILLNOW, Detective (1998-2003)
PORT ST. LUCIE PD, (1998-2003 & 2007-2008)
MAYOR OF PORT ST. LUCIE, (Mayors from 1998-2003 & 2007-2008)
POLICE CHIEF, PORT ST. LUCIE, (Chief from 1998-2003)
BOBBY KNOWLES, Former Sheriff, (1998-2001)
KEN MASCARA, Current Sheriff, (2001-present day)
FT. PIERCE PD, (1998-2003, 2005 & 2007-2008)
POLICE CHEIEF, FT. PIERCE, (1998-2003, 2005, 2007-2008, & 2010)
MAYOR OF FORT PIERCE, (1998-presen day)
PORT ST. LUCIE BOARD OF CITY COMMISSIONERS, (1998-2003 & 2007-2008)
FT. PIERCE BOARD OF CITY COMMISSIONERS, (1998- present day)
SAINT LUCIE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, (1998- present day)
DAN VAUGHN, Judge, (2000-present day)
LEATHA MULLINS, Attorney, (2000-2001)
TRACY A. NEMEROFSKY, Assistant State Attorney, (2000-2001)
DIAMOND R. LILLY, Public Defender, (2005 & 2007-2008)
DOREEN REGEANT, Assistant Public Defender, (2005)
PHILIP J. YACUCCI, Judge, (2004-2005)
FORT PIERCE POLICE OFFICER, CHICO, (1998-2003)
CHARLES A. NERVINE, Assistant Public Defender, (2007-2008)
LARRY SCHACK, Judge, (2008)
BRUCE H. COLTON, State Attorney (1998-present day)
ALICE CRUMP, Judicial Assistant, (2011-present day)
MAGISTRATE JUDGE T.H.O, (2012)
STATE OF FLORIDA, (1998-present day)
FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL, (1998-2003, 2004- 2005, 2007-2008, 2010, & present day)
THE FLORIDA BAR, (1998-present day))
GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA, (1998-2003, 2004-2005, 2007-2008, & present day))
FLORIDA SECRETARY OF STATE, (1998-2003, 2004-2005, 2007-2008, 2010- present day))
OFFICER WORTHINGTON, PSL PD, (2004-2005))
JEFFREY HENDRIKS, Assistant State Attorney, (2007-2008) and)
OFFICER COTTERMAN, Port Saint Lucie, PD (2007-2008))
OFFICER WARNER, Ft. Pierce, PD (2010))
_____)

COMPLAINT (Class Action)

(Note: The year dates by the names of defendants is referring to the year dates that the defendants are liable. It is not the date or establishment dates of businesses or start of work dates. Additionally, I separated each case in the Statement of the Case and Facts by state and county case numbers, in order to make it easier for everyone to read and keep track of events. Whenever, the word Plaintiff is seen, it is only referring to the authorized representative, Amunhotep El Bey. Whenever, the word Plaintiffs is seen, it is referring to the class. The class action aspect of this action is at the end under the embezzlement section.)

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff/Secured Party Creditor/Authorized Representative, Private Attorney General, **Amunhotep El Bey**, formerly known as the artificial person, EUGENE JAMES WILLIAMS, in Propria Persona (my own proper self), in the above styled cause, on the behalf of the class, the people of Florida, pursuant to 42 USC Section 1988 and/or 1983, sues and criminally prosecutes the defendants in their individual, professional, and official capacities for acting under the color of state law when violating federal law, and the Plaintiff' US Constitutional Rights. As causes of action for this action, the Plaintiffs will state as follows: Embezzlement, in violation of 18 USC Section 657 – Lending, Credit and Insurance Institutions; Treason, in violation of 18 USC Section 2381; Trespass, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments, to wit: 14th, 5th, and 4th, as well as in violation of 25 C.F.R. § 11.411 - Criminal Trespass; Right To Travel, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 5 and 14; Breach of contract – violation of Oath of Office, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 5, 14, 4, and 1, and also in violation of state and federal contract laws; 18 USC, specifically, 472 - Uttering Counterfeit Obligations Or Securities; 473 - Dealing In Counterfeit Obligations Or Securities; 474 - Plates, Stones, Or Analog, Digital, Or Electronic Images For Counterfeiting Obligations Or Securities; Slavery, in violation of International Law and anti-slavery Treaties and in violation of US Constitutional Amendment 13; Kidnapping, in violation of 18 USC Section 1201, and in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 4th, 14th, 5th, 13th and 8th; Fraud, in violation of International Law and 18 USC section 1001 - Statements Or Entries Generally, 18 USC Section 1028 - Fraud And Related Activity In Connection With Identification Documents, Authentication Features, And Information, C.F.R. Section 11.431 – False Reports, and 45 C.F.R. Section 3.4 – False Reports And Reports Of Injury Or Damage; False Imprisonment, in violation of the US Constitutional Amendments: 4, 5, 6, and 14, and in violation of C.F.R. Section 11.404 - False Imprisonment; Police Misconduct, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 5, 6, and 14; Incompetence, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 5, 14, and 1, and in violation of the Florida Rules of Professional conduct; Malicious Prosecution, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 1, 14, 6, 8, and 5; Denials of Access to the Courts, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 1, 14, 5, and 6; Defamation of Character, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 1, 5 and 14; Prosecutorial Misconduct, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 1, 6, 14, and 5; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 1, 6, 14, and 5; Conspiracy To Commit Racketeering, in violation of 18 USC section 371/18 USC Section 1961, and in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 5, 1, and 14; Obstructing Justice, in

violation of 25 C.F.R. 11.435 – Obstructing Justice, and in violation of US Constitutional Amendments 14, 5, and 6; Suppression of Evidence, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 6, 5, and 14; Wrongful Conviction(s), in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 1, 5, 4, 8, 14, 6, and 13; To Be Free From Cruel And Unusual Punishment, in violation of the 8th Amendment under the US Constitution; lost wages and loss of the enjoyment of life, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 5, 14, 8, and 1; Mental and Emotional Distress, in violation of the 8th Amendment under the US Constitution; No-Holder-In-Due-Course, in violation of International Law, Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), 3-308; No Corpus Delicti, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments, 5, 6, 14, and 1; Defendants violated Plaintiff's 11th Amendment, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, provided by the 11th Amendment under the US Constitution; Defendants prosecuted and convicted the Plaintiff in an non-article III court, in violation of Article III section III of the US Constitution, in which the violations constitutes Improper Venue, because jurisdiction lies with the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, according to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 USC Section 1330; Defendants had no standing and no jurisdiction to prosecute and convict the Plaintiff when Congress replaced statutes with International law, on December 26, 1933, to wit: 49 Statute 3097, Treaty Series, "Convention on Rights and Duties of States;" Defendants prosecuted and convicted the Plaintiff in the presence of a person not a judge, "Coram Non Judice," in violation of US Constitutional Amendments: 1, 5, 14, 6, 4, 8, and 13; and Defendants falsely classified the Plaintiff as an Alien Enemy Resident, under 50 USC, Chapter 3, in Appendix Section 23, "Jurisdiction of the United States Court and Judges," in order to qualify Plaintiff as a criminal defendant for criminal prosecution.

The Plaintiffs seeks a trial by jury, as well as injunctive relief, compensatory, and punitive damages.

The Plaintiff is not a lawyer and his pleadings cannot be treated as such. In fact, according to *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), a complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears "beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id., at 520-521, quoting *Conley v. Gibson,* 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). "[A] pro se Plaintiff's pleadings should be liberally construed to do substantial justice." United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 108 (3d Cir.1999).

PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL

According to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27,enacted April 9, 1866, (and sometimes referred to as The Private Attorney General Act) 39th Congress, Sess 1, Ch 31 (1866), CHAP. XXXL, (Formally titled): An Act to protect all Person in the United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication, April 9, 1866; Public Law 104-317, Oct 19, 1996, 110 Stat 3853; 93 stat 1284; Public Law 96-170, 96th Congress, Dec 9th 1979.

Private attorney general is an informal term usually used today in the United States to refer to a private party who brings a lawsuit considered to be in the public interest, i.e., benefiting the general public and not just the plaintiff. The person considered "private attorney general" is entitled to recover attorney's fees if he or she prevails. The rationale behind this principle is to provide extra incentive to private citizens to pursue suits that may be of benefit to society at large.

The private attorney general, made its first appearance in the legal literature in a 1943 decision by Judge Jerome Frank for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. (See Assoc. Indus. of New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). Judge Frank concluded that Congress could authorize a private citizen to file suit even if the sole purpose of the case were to vindicate the public interest as opposed to some private interest of the litigant: "Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals." In drawing this conclusion, Judge Frank analogized this citizen suit to a *qui tam* action. *Id.* at 704-705 (discussing U.S. *ex rel.* Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1942)); and also Colorado Radio Corp. v. F.C.C., 118 F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (Edgerton, J.,concurring)

The Plaintiff holds the position as a Private Attorney General under the 1866 Vindication and Civil Rights Act of the 39th Congress. This Congressional act gives the Plaintiff the authority to step in when the states fail or the government fails to uphold and protect the rights of the citizens. This Congressional act allows Plaintiff to act as a prosecutor and to be able to bring charges on those who hold public office and hold them accountable for their misdeeds and misconduct in breach of their Trustee duties as fiduciaries; as is written in the Lieber Code, under General Orders No. 100, this includes insurrection and rebellion, and misuse of their/that public office in order to abuse and to incite a riot among the peaceful inhabitants.

14TH AMENDMENT BOUNTY HUNTER

The 14th Amendment, section 4, has a clause in it concerning a bounty against insurrection and rebellion, and that no money should be taken out of the Treasury. This complies with the Confiscation Act of 1861 and would allow Plaintiff to confiscate defendants property and everything they own to pay for these hearings, trials, and fines imposed, and put the money back into the Treasury to help pay back the Public Debt. This should be agreeable with the court as this is what the 14th Amendment bounty is for.

This court would also allow the People to restore the property and natural resources that have been taken from this country by unlawful means by the defendants who have used their public offices to pillage, plunder and loot the resources of this country, and have used the revenue from this for their own private gain and not for the Public good.

Plaintiffs are here to inform the court that under USC Title 31, section 3729, there are false claims in Florida State Courts, and that this Private Attorney General holds a position as a Bounty Hunter. I am and we are here to collect the Public Debt that has been caused by the defendants. This collection of such Public Debt will be issued back to the United States Treasury to bring down the National Debt caused by the defendants, or any similar persons. Defendants

are required to report to the IRS the money they received from the public while engaged in commerce as public officials. The IRS is then required to discharge the National and public debt under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The defendants are pocketing the public money for their own interest and gain without even reporting it to the IRS. The sad part is that defendants received pay checks from their state and/or local government, so defendants had money already and they were just being greedy. This is clear embezzlement.

JURISDICTION

This court is an Article III Court and has jurisdiction according to Article III, section III of the US Constitution for claims or issues dealing with federal law, Treaties, and the US Constitution.

This court has Federal Question Jurisdiction due to the fact that Federal Law, International Law, and Constitutional Law has been violated by the defendants (see this foregoing complaint or the record of this court for further proof. It is marked as Exhibit A. It was filed with a Notice of removal, on June 6, 2012, by the Plaintiff, in Case Number 12-CV-14201-JEM. The evidence is named: Affidavit in the nature of Writ of Error Coram Nobis & a demand for Dismissal or state the Proper Jurisdiction).

This court has Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction, according to 28 USC Section 1332, due to the fact that the Plaintiff is not a US Citizen and the defendants are US Citizens and/or foreign agents; therefore, diversity of citizenship exists, which gives this Court original jurisdiction. The Plaintiff is a Washitaw Moor and our Native American Tribe of THE REPUBLIC of America, is a sovereign tribe and enjoys diversity of citizenship; because the Washitaw Moors are a nation within a nation and foreign to the jurisdiction of the united States (see the record of this court for further proof. It is marked as Exhibit B. It was filed with a Notice of removal, on June 6, 2012, by the Plaintiff, in Case Number 12-CV-14201-JEM. The evidence is named: Affidavit of Nationality), and the amount in question is over $75,000 dollars.

VENUE

This court is the proper venue due to the fact that the court is located in Saint Lucie County, Fort Pierce, FL, the Southern District of Florida, and so are most of the defendants and the Plaintiff. The causes of action arose out of Saint Lucie County, Fort Pierce, FL, on March 16, 1998(arrest date), through this present date, and some are ongoing in nature.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The Plaintiff's contracts, the Judgment of convictions, stemming from 98-823-CF, 562004CT005567, 2004CT0005567, 2005CT002801, 562007CF4217, 2007TR043187 A1, 2007TR043182 A1, 2010MM001552 A, Ticket number 9562DGR, Ticket Number 9561DRG, Ticket number 9551DRF, Ticket number 8318 DRF, Ticket Number 6342DYC 1, Ticket Number 6341 DYC X, Ticket number 6344DYC 3, Ticket number 6343DYC 2, Ticket Number

1045DRF 5, Ticket number 1046DRF 6, Ticket Number 1047DRF 7, Ticket number 1048DRF 8, and Ticket number 7287DBQ 4, are all null and void due to lack of jurisdiction and other grounds as well (see the record of this court for further proof. It is marked as Exhibit A. It was filed with a Notice of removal, on June 6, 2012, by the Plaintiff, in Case Number 12-CV-14201-JEM. The evidence is named: Affidavit: In the Nature of Writ of Error Coram Nobis & a Demand for Dismissal or State the Proper Jurisdiction).

The Plaintiff relies upon the said unrebutted affidavit (see the record of this court. Affidavit: In the Nature of Writ of Error Coram Nobis) that gave the state of Florida 30 days to respond or default judgment would be sought in any higher court of law. The 30 days expired for the state of Florida to answer, so the Plaintiff filed Petitioner's Motion for Default Judgment (see the record of this court. It is marked as Exhibit G. It was filed with a Notice of removal, on June 6, 2012, by the Plaintiff, in Case Number 12-CV-14201-JEM. The evidence is named: Petitioner's Motion for Default Judgment).

The Plaintiff has the record of this court as evidence that all of the above listed criminal cases, criminal traffic cases, misdemeanor cases, and traffic tickets/traffic cases are in default judgment. "Default," according to the Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, means judgment.

Due to the record, all of the defendants are liable for all of the causes of action named herein, because wrongful conviction, false imprisonment, fraud, kidnapping, false arrest, treason, trespass, Denials of access to the courts, obstructing justice, and etc., are already proven by the record, and resulted mainly from defendants lack of jurisdiction; therefore, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and/or State Court Remedies is satisfied. It is not Plaintiff's fault that the State Circuit Court is trying to avoid liability by not ruling upon the Plaintiff's pleadings filed in state court. It is evident that Plaintiff has given the State of Florida all of the due process in the world and it's not Plaintiff's fault that the state doesn't want to play fair by avoiding default judgment when it is clearly warranted.

Even if Plaintiff didn't have the record proving default judgment in state court, this court would still have jurisdiction to review and/or hear this civil action due to its merits, injury/prejudice of Plaintiff, and violations of federal law and Plaintiff' constitutional rights. This court can even grant a Writ of Error Coram Nobis on its own if justice deems it appropriate as a result of a review of the record or a hearing. This court has judicial power derived from Article III Section III of the US Constitutional and has absolute authority to grant relief when it's obvious that the state is giving the Plaintiff the run-around; especially, when the Plaintiff is a diplomat of a Sovereign Nation. The Plaintiff's status alone qualifies him as federal custody only. The state cases filed against the Plaintiff were never filed in the proper venue to begin with, so exhaustion of remedies shouldn't even be an issue.

This action is by no means a challenge of plaintiff's criminal cases, because those proceedings are already in default, as is evident by the record of this court, marked as Exhibit A, in case number 12-CV-14201-JEM. (See Affidavit in the nature of Writ of Error Coram Nobis, filed June 6, 2012, with this court along with Plaintiff's notice of removal) This foregoing action is a

means of serving justice to defendants who were not addressed in Plaintiff's said affidavit. The Plaintiff's state criminal and traffic cases serve as no bar to this action because, technically, based upon the grounds and the law, Plaintiff has already won due to default; the Plaintiff is just waiting for default judgment and has the record to prove it. All of Plaintiff's claims have been exhausted in state court.

COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES RELIED UPON

Maxims of Law:

"IN COMMERCE FOR A MATTER TO BE RESOLVED MUST BE EXPRESSED" Heb. 4:16; Phil 4:6; Eph. 6:19-21. Legal Maxim: "He who fails to assert his rights has none."

"ALL ARE EQUAL UNDER THE LAW" (God's Law – Moral and Natural Law)
Exodus 21:23-25; Lev 24: 17-21: Deut 1:17, 19:21, Mat. 22:36-40; Luke 10:17; Col 3:25. "NO ONE IS ABOVE THE LAW"

"IN COMMERCE TRUTH IS SOVEREIGN"
Exodus 20:16; Ps. 117:2; John 8:32; II Cor. 13:8.Truth is sovereign – and the Sovereign tells only the truth. Your word is your bond.

"TRUTH IS EXPRESSED IN THE FORM OF AN AFFIDAVIT"
Lev. 5:4-5; Lev 6:3-5; Lev. 19:11-13; Num. 30:2; Mat. 5:33; James 5:12.

"AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT STANDS AS TRUTH IN COMMERCE"12 Pet. 1:25; Heb. 6:13-15. Claims made in your affidavit, if not rebutted, emerge as the truth of the matter. Legal Maxim: "He who does not deny, admits."

"AN UNREBUTTED AFFIDAVIT BECOMES THE JUDGMENT IN COMMERCE" Heb. 6:16-17. There is nothing left to resolve.

THE STATE HAS NO 11TH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

The state's 11TH Amendment Immunity is waived under Title 42 USC 2000d-7 because federal funding and civil rights violations are at issue before this federal court.

STATEMENTS OF THE CASE AND FACTS

(Note: this section of the Statements of the Case and Facts deals with State Circuit Case Number 98-823-CF)

1. On February 23, 1998, at approximately 5:40 PM, various offenses were allegedly committed at the Chan's residence, located at 613 SW Pueblo Terrace in the City of Port Saint Lucie, Florida.

2. Defendant, Detective Wade Willnow, was the lead officer investigating Agency Case Number 983-02-1134, which later created criminal felony case number 98-823-CF.
3. Initially, it appeared that the culprits had made a clean get away until defendant Willnow talked with members of the Chan Family. The Chan family believed that one of Plaintiff's co-defendants, Keavin Wade, was involved in the offenses, because he had extorted money from their son in the past.
4. At this point in time, the suspicion of the victims, the Chan Family, was the only lead that defendant had at the time, so he used the victim's suspicion solely to further and sustain the investigation.
5. Defendant Willnow is an experienced Law Enforcement Officer; therefore, he knew or should have known that sole police suspicion alone is not legally sufficient to warrant probable cause, and/or establish probable cause; and that victims suspicion falls within the same category as police suspicion. He should have stopped the investigation in order to protect the Plaintiff's 4th Amendment Constitutional rights of probable cause.
6. Unfortunately, the unlawful investigation did yield fruits of a poisonous tree, because defendant Willnow located two of the Plaintiff's former, juvenile, co-defendants, Keavin Wade and Tobias Thomas (who ultimately provided tape confessions, without defendant Willnow notifying the said juveniles of their right to have their parents present during the taped interview), implicating themselves, the Plaintiff, and other co-defendants: Robert Barnes, Jenny Mumma, and Steven Johnson, in the offenses.
7. Only one of the Plaintiff's co-defendants picked him from a photo-line up. That one was Tobias Thomas. All of the others couldn't identify him and didn't even know the Plaintiff's name. The investigation towards the Plaintiff should have ceased at this point, but unfortunately, this was not the case.
8. Defendant Willnow even provided the Plaintiff's co-defendants, Keavin Wade and Tobias Thomas, the first two apprehended co-defendants, with the Plaintiff's name during their taped interview confessions. This is clear police misconduct and in violation of Plaintiff's US Constitutional Amendments: 4, 5, 14, and 6. Both taped confessions were conducted on March 3, 1998, by defendant Willnow, in Port ST. Lucie PD, Agency Case# 983-02-1134.
9. The Plaintiff suffered prejudice/injury, because the said series of events lead to the arrest of the Plaintiff, by defendant, Fort Pierce Police Officer, Chico, on March 16, 1998 at 1:00A.M, (with an arrest warrant initiated by defendant Willnow), who was charged with Armed Home Invasion Robbery with a Firearm while wearing a mask; Armed Burglary of a Dwelling while wearing a Mask; Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon while wearing a Mask; Battery on an Elderly Person while wearing a Mask; and Battery while wearing a Mask (See case number 98-823-CF).
10. Defendant Willnow stated in his deposition that the Plaintiff had confessed to the offenses on March 16, 1998 at 1:00P.M., at the Saint Lucie County Jail, when he interviewed him. There is no taped confession or written waiver that proves that the

Plaintiff confessed and the alleged confession is the state's strongest piece of evidence against the Plaintiff.

11. Defendant Willnow even admits in his deposition that the Plaintiff asked to speak with a lawyer during his visit. This fact makes the visit by defendant Willnow a violation of the 6th Amendment Right to Counsel. The Plaintiff had took the 5th Amendment and asked to speak with a lawyer during the visit by defendant Willnow.
12. Defendant Willnow willfully and knowingly falsified the police report and his deposition when he stated under Oath that the Plaintiff had confessed. As a result of defendant Willnow's false statements and false reports, he violated C.F.R. Section 11.431 – False Reports, and 45 C.F.R. Section 3.4 – False Reports And Reports Of Injury Or Damage.
13. Attaching a confession to the Plaintiff when he had not confessed is clear police misconduct, fraud, false statements, false imprisonment, wrongful conviction, false imprisonment, and etc. The causes of action goes on and on; mainly, because if not for defendant Willnow's false statements that created the false reports, the Plaintiff would have never been convicted in state circuit case number 98-823-CF.
14. Defendant Willnow failed to conduct a thorough investigation by failing to interview the Plaintiff's Grandparents and mother or any other member. If he would have done so like he should have, he would have learned that the Plaintiff's truck is white and not blue; not like how the Plaintiff's co-defendants described it and that the Plaintiff's truck was disabled during the time the offenses were allegedly committed on Feb 23, 1998 around 5:30 P.M.
15. As a result of defendant Willnow's failure to thoroughly investigate, to do his duty and job, the Plaintiff suffered prejudice/injury, because the Plaintiff was convicted and charged in state circuit case number 98-823-CF, and went to prison as a result of his failure. This is clear incompetence that violated the Plaintiff's federally secured US Constitution Rights guaranteed by the 13th ,5th, 14th, and 6th Amendments; as well as breach of contract, because defendant Willnow violated his Oath of Office: to protect and to serve the people and to protect and defend the US and State Constitutions, with his actions and inactions alleged herein.
16. Defendants: the Port Saint Lucie PD, defendant, Mayor of Port Saint Lucie (1998-2003), defendant, Port Saint Lucie Police Chief (1998-2003), defendant, Port St. Lucie Board of City Commissioners (1998-2003), defendant, Saint Lucie Board of County Commissioners (1998-2003), defendant, Governor (1998-2003), defendant, Secretary of State (1998-2003), defendant, State of Florida, defendant, Florida Attorney General (1998-2003), and defendant Bobby Knowles, are/were all the chief policy makers, superiors, and/or employers of defendant Willnow; therefore, they are all ultimately responsible for his actions, because he acted via powers given to him by the color of state law and local government.
17. Whereas, the above named said defendants are all liable for all of the causes of action listed herein and US Constitutional Rights violations, via their agent, defendant,

Willnow, who acted under the color of state law when he violated the defendants, his superiors, policies, customs, and/or practices that required defendant Willnow to uphold and defend the State and US Constitutions, as well as to serve and to protect the people; however, it is evident that defendant Willnow violated the Plaintiff's rights in too many ways to count; thereby, making the said defendant and his superiors liable for his actions and inactions.

18. Defendant, Michael J. Kessler, was a court appointed special public defender that was ineffective and incompetent for not suppressing the Plaintiff's alleged confession and moving the court for dismissal of the charges. If Kessler would have done so, the court would have dismissed him from the case because the confession was the state's only evidence. The Plaintiff would have never gone to state prison if Kessler would have filed a motion to suppress.
19. Defendant, Kessler, was ineffective and incompetent for not filing a counterclaim against the state for the actions of defendant Willnow, which would have gotten the charges dropped by the state. The Plaintiff advised Kessler of everything defendant Willnow did and did not do, so there is no excuse why Kessler couldn't file a counterclaim against the state.
20. Defendant, Kessler, was ineffective and incompetent for not challenging the jurisdiction of the state and the court when Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11TH Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was convicted in the Improper Venue. If Kessler would have challenged the jurisdiction of the court and state, the Plaintiff would have never gone to prison in State Circuit Case Number 98-823-CF. Defendant Kessler could have easily filed a motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional grounds and got all the charges dismissed against the Plaintiff.
21. Based upon all of the claims of incompetence and ineffective assistance of counsel, it is very evident that defendant, Kessler, failed to provide the Plaintiff with the effective assistance of counsel, which is guaranteed by the 6th Amendment under the US Constitution, the 5th Amendment, Due Process and the 14th Amendment, Equal Protection; and the Plaintiff was clearly injured or suffered prejudice, because Plaintiff went to prison.
22. On April 9, 1999, the Plaintiff appeared in open court with, defendant, Kessler. Assistant State Attorney Steven L. Levin was present for the state of Florida. Plaintiff was sentenced to 10 years state prison over his objection that he wanted to withdraw his plea.
23. Defendant Kessler was ineffective for conspiracy to commit racketeering, on April 9, 1999. Kessler, had a mutual agreement with defendant, Joanne Holman, defendant, Dwight Geiger, defendant, Steven Levin, defendant, Bruce Colton, and defendant, Bobby Knowles that they would arrest, detain, cite, process, charge, transport, and try all suspects and defendants as authorized under color of state law as State actors, and their

enterprise, (defendant, 19th Judicial Circuit) would extort money/convictions/commerce from ignorant people of the law under threat, duress, and coercion; because of the threat that if you don't comply with the colorable judgments of the enterprise, (defendant, 19th Judicial Circuit) you would be arrested and detained, taxed, fined, sanctioned, or license's taken away. This is clear evidence of the meeting of the minds to extort funds and illegal convictions from ignorant people of the law. The Plaintiff was one of those ignorant people of law and he suffered prejudice or injury, because he received a contract to serve 10 years state prison, which sent him to prison.

24. Just to flash out the charges of Conspiracy to Commit Racketeering, defendants, Kessler, Holman, Levin, Knowles, Colton, and Geiger all committed treason, trespass, wrongful conviction, false imprisonment, fraud, slavery, incompetence, kidnapping, malicious prosecution, and etc., because none of these defendants had jurisdiction to move the case forward because Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11TH Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was charged and tried in the Improper Venue. Any one of the said jurisdictional grounds by itself would have gotten the Plaintiff's charges dismissed. Defendant, Kessler was, of course, ineffective for not filing a motion to dismiss, as stated previously, but defendants, Holman, Levin, Knowles, and Geiger knew better or should have known better then to convict the Plaintiff without having the jurisdiction to do so. Legal Maxim: "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." Officers of the court are presumed to know the law; therefore, the actions of the defendants were done willfully with total disregards towards Plaintiff's US Constitutional Rights and Human Rights, and federal law in general.
25. The Plaintiff was sentenced against his will, on April 9, 1999, by defendants, Kessler, Levin, Knowles, defendant, Holman, and defendant, Geiger, which resulted in bonds being attached to his person for violations of Florida Statutes. The Plaintiff was declared indigent and was unable to pay these bonds, so he was given an unlawful contract for 10 years state prison that was signed by Plaintiff under threat, duress, and coercion. The Plaintiff feared that he had no choice but to go along with everything because of the manpower of the former sheriff, defendant, Knowles. The Plaintiff was sent to prison shortly thereafter, on his journey of cruel and unusual punishment.
26. Defendant Steven Levin engaged in acts of prosecutorial misconduct when he helped to sentence the Plaintiff to 10 years state prison, on April 9, 1998, in State Circuit Case Number 98-823-CF. This cause of action is clear when considering the fact that Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11TH Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was charged and tried in the Improper Venue. The State and the court never had the jurisdiction to move the case forward, based upon the said

jurisdictional grounds, and defendant Levin either knew or should have known of the said jurisdictional grounds; therefore, defendant Levin is guilty of all causes of action, because he is an Officer of the Court and is presumed to know the law. Legal Maxim: "He who knows acts willfully."

27. Defendants Kessler, Colton, Geiger, Levin, as a Member of the Florida Bar, violated their oaths with defendant, Florida Bar, and their Oaths of Office (to uphold and defend the US and Florida Constitution), due to their actions and inactions; therefore, they breached their contracts with the Florida Bar and the people when they violated their performance requirements of their oaths, and violated the Florida Rules of Professional conduct, to maintain a level of competency. Defendants even violated their duties to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.
28. Defendant, Florida Bar, is responsible for the actions and inactions of defendants: Kessler, Colton, Geiger, and Levin, because they are or were members of the FL Bar. Defendant Levin is or was licensed with defendant, Florida Bar; therefore, the FL Bar is responsible for their incompetence and the Plaintiff's US Constitutional Rights violations.
29. Defendants: the Port Saint Lucie PD, Mayor of Port Saint Lucie (1998-2003), Port Saint Lucie Police Chief (1998-2003), Port St. Lucie Board of City Commissioners (1998-2003), Saint Lucie Board of County Commissioners (1998-present day), Governor (1998-2003), Secretary of State (1998-2003), State of Florida, 19th Judicial circuit, Fort Pierce Board of City Commissioners (1998-present day), Florida Attorney General (1998-2003), Brue Colton, Bobby Knowles, Florida Bar, Fort Pierce PD, Fort Pierce Police Chief, and Mayor of Fort Pierce (1998-2003), are/were all the chief policy makers, superiors, and/or employers of defendants: Kessler, Willnow, Geiger, Levin, Holman, and Fort Pierce Police Officer, Arresting Officer, Chico; therefore, they are all ultimately responsible for their actions and inactions, because they acted via powers given to them under the color of state law and local government.
30. Whereas, the above named defendants are all liable for all of the causes of action listed herein and the US Constitutional Rights violations, via their agents, defendants: Chico, Kessler, Knowles, Willnow, Geiger, Levin, and Holman, who acted under the color of state law when they violated the defendants, their superiors, policies, customs, and/or practices that required them to maintain the oaths that they took to uphold and to protect the State and US Constitution, as well as to serve and protect the people; however, it is evident that defendants: Chico, Kessler, Willnow, Geiger, Levin, Knowles, and Holman, violated the Plaintiff's rights in too many ways to count; thereby, making the said defendants and their superiors liable for their actions and inactions.
31. Defendants, Chico, Geiger, Knowles, Colton, and Holman violated their oaths of office by failing to protect and/or uphold the state and US Constitutions; therefore, a breach of contract occurred between the said defendants and the state, local, county governments, and the people that they swore an oath to protect and to serve. This is clearly manifest,

due to their alleged actions and inactions which gave rise to causes of action and violations of the Plaintiff's US Constitutional Rights.

32. Plaintiff filed an appeal and won. The Plaintiff's case was reversed and remanded back to the 19th Judicial Circuit.
33. Defendant, Leatha Mullins, was a court appointed special public defender that was ineffective and incompetent for not suppressing the Plaintiff's alleged confession and moving the court for dismissal of the charges. If Mullins would have done so, the court would have dismissed the Plaintiff from the cases because the confession was the state's only evidence. The Plaintiff would have never gone to state prison if Mullins would have filed a motion to suppress.
34. Defendant, Mullins, was ineffective and incompetent for not filing a counterclaim against the state for the actions for defendant Willnow, which would have gotten the charges dropped by the state. The Plaintiff advised Mullins of everything defendant Willnow did and did not do, so there is no excuse why Mullins couldn't file a counterclaim or a motion to dismiss against the state.
35. Defendant, Mullins, was ineffective and incompetent for not challenging the jurisdiction of the state and the court when Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11TH Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was convicted in the Improper Venue. If Mullins would have challenged the jurisdiction of the court and state, the Plaintiff would have never gone to prison in State Circuit Case Number 98-823-CF. Defendant Mullins could have easily filed a motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional grounds and got all charges dismissed against the Plaintiff.
36. Based upon all of the claims of incompetence and ineffective assistance of counsel, it is very evident that defendant, Mullins, failed to provide the Plaintiff with the effective assistance of counsel, which is guaranteed by the 6th Amendment under the US Constitution, the 5th Amendment, Due Process and the 14th Amendment, Equal Protection; and the Plaintiff was clearly injured or suffered prejudice, because Plaintiff went to prison, as a result of Mullins actions and inactions.
37. On February 14, 2001, the Plaintiff appeared in open court with Defendant, Mullins, defendant, Assistant State Attorney, Tracy Nemerofsky was present for the state of Florida. Plaintiff was sworn and entered a plea of no contest to count II- Home Invasion Robbery (lesser) F.S. 812.135F1, and count XVIII- Battery while wearing a mask, F.S 784.03M1.
38. The Presentence Investigation (PSI) was waived and the Plaintiff was sentenced to count II – Seventy Ground Twenty-Five (70.25) months state prison with 1066 days jail time credit by defendant, Judge, Dan Vaughn. Defendant, ASA, Tracy Nemerofsky announced a no process on counts VI – Burglary of Dwelling with an assault, X – Battery

on an elderly Person While wearing a Mask, and XIV – Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon.

39. Defendant, Mullins, was ineffective and incompetent for Conspiracy to Commit Racketeering, fraud, wrongful conviction, and etc., along with defendants: Vaughn, Nemerofsky, Holman, Colton, and Mascara, in order to extort money in the form of a conviction, a bond(s), from the Plaintiff by threat, duress, and coercion; as well as transport, detain, and process the Plaintiff; and obtain a conviction by any means necessary against the Plaintiff; and by upgrading the Plaintiff's prior record from burglary of an unoccupied Structure to burglary of an Occupied Structure; during sentencing, on February 14, 2001, before defendant, Vaughn.
40. Defendants: Mullins, Vaughn, Nemerofsky, Holman, Colton, and Mascara had an agreement or mutual understanding to extort money from Plaintiff, prevent the Plaintiff from going to trial, and obtain a conviction by any means necessary. The only way that this could be accomplished was to have someone that could work on the inside. That someone was the Plaintiff's very own defense counsel, defendant Mullins.
41. Defendant Mullins, made several visit to the Saint Lucie County Jail where the Plaintiff was being illegally detained by defendant Mascara without jurisdiction. During these visits defendant Mullins would play psychological strategic manipulative mind games with the Plaintiff by misadvising the Plaintiff that it would be in his best interest to plead no contest and take 6 years state prison, and by Mullins prolonging the case, 98-823-CF, by filing continuance after continuance in order to buy herself and the state time.
42. Defendant Mullins role was to be wholly ineffective in all aspects of her criminal defensive role, and her role consisted of being a potential weapon for the state; one who could relay information to defendants: Vaughn, Colton, Nemerofsky, Holman, and Mascara.
43. Defendant Mullins' motive for conspiring with the state was her pledge of allegiance with the state, her friendship with defendant Nemerofsky, and her belief that the Plaintiff actually committed the offenses.
44. The conspiracy was initiated from the time Plaintiff first met Mullins in court for arraignment, on November 8, 2000, before defendant Vaughn and climaxed when defendants: Vaughn, Holman, Mascara, Mullins, and Nemerofsky conspired, on February 14, 2001, before defendant Vaughn to successfully upgrade the Plaintiff's prior record from Burglary of an Unoccupied Structure to Burglary of an Occupied Structure.
45. Defendants: Vaughn, Mullins, Holman, Mascara, and Nemerofsky came to a mutual agreement to extort money and maliciously prosecute the Plaintiff when he was sentencing to 5 years and 10 months state prison; maliciously, because his Prior record was upgraded causing his point total on the 1995 Sentencing Guidelines Scoresheet to reflect the error of 84.2 points.
46. The math in this case is simple, because according to F.S. 921.0013., II-Home Invasion Robbery F.S. 812.135 F1., is a level 8 offense that scores to 74 points; CT. XVIII-Battery

While Wearing a Mask F.S. 784.03M1., is an additional offense that scores to 1.2 points; and the Plaintiff's correct prior record conviction of Burglary of an Unoccupied Structure F.S. 810.02 (4) (a) F3, which is a level 4 offense that scores up to 2.4 points.

47. The Plaintiffs total sentence points should have only been 77.6 points. However, the trial court must subtract 28 points, which calculates to 49.6 months state prison.
48. The maximum prison months the Plaintiff could have received under the 1995 Sentencing Guidelines Scoresheet is 62.0 months state prison. The minimum prison months the defendant could have received is 34.40 months state prison; therefore, the 1995 Sentencing Guidelines Scoresheet that was used to sentence the Plaintiff on February 14, 2001, is and was in error.
49. This miscalculation occurred when the defendants willfully upgraded the Plaintiff's prior record to Burglary of an Occupied Structure, which is a 2nd degree felony and a level 6 offense that scores 9 points. The incorrect point score of 9 points from the correct point score of 2.4 points is what caused the 1995 scoresheet that was used during the Feb. 14, 2001 sentencing to be in error.
50. The miscalculation caused the Plaintiff to receive the maximum sentence allowed and caused him to serve months in state prison that he would have never had to serve if defendants: Mullins, Vaughn, Holman, Nemerofsky, and Mascara had not conspired against him to upgrade his prior record, and convict him without having proper venue, jurisdiction, and etc.
51. A reasonable probability exists that if Plaintiff's 1995 scoresheet would have been calculated right, he would have gotten time served, or either Plaintiff would have had to serve only a few months in state prison – considering, the fact that if the scoresheet would have been scored right the maxium prison sentence would have been 62.0 months state prison; therefore, prejudice/injury is very manifest in this instance, due to the conspiratorial behavior, actions and inactions, of the defendants.
52. Just to flash out the charge of Conspiracy to Commit Racketeering, defendants: Mullins, Holman, Willnow, Nemerofsky, Mascara, Chico, Colton, and Vaughn all committed treason, trespass, wrongful conviction, false imprisonment, fraud, slavery, incompetence, kidnapping, malicious prosecution, and etc., because none of these defendants had jurisdiction to move the case forward because Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11TH Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was charged and convicted in the Improper Venue. Any one of the said jurisdictional grounds by itself would have gotten the Plaintiff's charges dismissed. Defendant, Mullins was, of course, ineffective for not filing a motion to dismiss, as stated previously, but defendants: Mullins, Willnow, Holman, Nemerofsky, Mascara, Colton, and Vaughn, knew better or should have known better then to convict the Plaintiff without having the jurisdiction to do so. Legal Maxim: "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." Officers of the court are

presumed to know the law; therefore, the actions of the defendants were done willfully with total disregards towards Plaintiff's US Constitutional Rights and Human Rights.

53. The Plaintiff was sentenced, on February 14, 2001, by defendants: Mullins, Holman, Nemerofsky, Willnow, Mascara, Colton, and Vaughn, which resulted in bonds being attached to his person for violations of Florida Statutes. The Plaintiff was declared indigent and was unable to pay these bonds, so he was given an unlawful contract for 5 years and 10 months state prison that was signed by Plaintiff under threat, duress, and coercion. The Plaintiff feared that he had no choice but to go along with everything because of the manpower of the sheriff, defendant, Mascara.
54. Defendant Nemerofsky engaged in acts of prosecutorial misconduct when she helped to sentence the Plaintiff to 5 years and 10 months state prison, on February 14, 2001, in State Circuit Case Number 98-823-CF. This cause of action is clear when considering the fact that Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11TH Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was charged and tried in the Improper Venue. The State and the court never had the jurisdiction to move the case forward, based upon the said jurisdictional grounds, and defendant Nemerofsky either knew or should have known of the said jurisdictional grounds; therefore, defendant Nemerofsky is guilty of all causes of action, because she is an Officer of the Court and is presumed to know the law. Legal Maxim: "He who knows acts willfully."
55. Defendants: Mullins, Nemerofsky, Vaughn, and Colton, as Members of the Florida Bar, violated their oaths with defendant, Florida Bar (to uphold and defend the US and State Constitution), with their actions and inactions; therefore, they breached their contracts (oaths) with the Florida Bar when they violated the performance requirements of their Florida Bar Oaths and the Rules of Professional Conduct, to maintain a level of competency.
56. Defendant, Florida Bar, is responsible for the actions and inactions of defendants: Mullins, Nemerofsky, Vaughn, and Colton because they are or were members of the FL Bar. Defendants are or were licensed with defendant, Florida Bar; therefore, the FL Bar is responsible for all of their causes of action.
57. Defendants: Chico, Vaughn, Mascara, Nemerofsky, Colton, Willnow, and Holman violated their oaths of office by failing to protect and/or uphold the US and Florida Constitution; therefore, a breach of contract occurred between the said defendants and the state, local, county governments, and the people that they swore an oath to protect and to serve. This is clearly manifest, due to their alleged actions and inactions which gave rise to all of the causes of action and violations of Plaintiff's US Constitutional Rights.
58. Defendants: Port Saint Lucie PD, Mayor of Port Saint Lucie (1998-2003), Port Saint Lucie Police Chief (1998-2003), Port St. Lucie Board of City Commissioners (1998-2003), Saint Lucie Board of County Commissioners (1998-present day), Governor (1998-

2003), Secretary of State (1998-2003), State of Florida, 19th Judicial circuit, Fort Pierce Board of City Commissioners (1998-present day), Florida Attorney General (1998-2003), Brue Colton, Ken Mascara, Florida Bar, Fort Pierce PD, Fort Pierce Police Chief, and Mayor of Fort Pierce (1998-2003), are/were all the chief policy makers, superiors, and/or employers of defendants: Mullins, Nemerofsky, Willnow, Holman, Mascara, Vaughn, and Fort Pierce Police Officer, Chico; therefore, they are all ultimately responsible for their actions and inactions, because they acted via powers given to them under the color of state law and local government.

59. Whereas, the above named defendants are all liable for all of the causes of action listed herein and US Constitutional Rights violations, via their agents, defendants: Chico, Mullins, Willnow, Vaughn, Nemerofsky, Mascara, and Holman, who acted under the color of state law when they violated the defendants, their superiors, policies, customs, and/or practices that requires them to maintain a level of competency and uphold their Oaths of Office; however, it is evident that defendants: Chico, Mullins, Willnow, Vaughn, Nemerofsky, Knowles, and Holman, violated the Plaintiff's rights in too many ways to count; thereby, making the said defendants and their superiors liable for their actions and inactions. If not for the defendants unconstitutional acts and inactions, the Plaintiff's life and reputation would have never been ruined because Plaintiff would have never went to state prison. Due to the unlawful acts and inactions of the defendants, the Plaintiff can't vote, can't are arms, and can't even get a decent job because of his criminal record.
60. The Plaintiff was released from state prison on September 16, 2003, serving 5 years and ten months in state prison, 2,010 days to be exact, if you count every day of the Plaintiff's illegal incarceration stemming from case numbers 98-823-CF and 562004CT005567. The arrest was illegal, because the State lacked the jurisdiction and proper venue to do so, and etc (see record of this court, marked as Exhibit A: Affidavit in the Nature of Writ of Error Coram Nobis, for further detail).
61. The Plaintiff can't vote, can't bare arms, lost of wages and the potential for a great deal of money, barred from certain jobs, and can't even get a decent job because of the charges stemming from State Circuit Court Case Number 98-823-CF. The said defendants ruined the Plaintiff's life with their alleged actions and inactions. The outcome would have been different if the defendants would have done their job by protecting and defending the Plaintiff's US Constitutional Rights, because Plaintiff would have never went to prison.

(This section of the Statements of the Case and Facts deals with State County Number 562004CT005567.)

1. On October 10, 2004, the Plaintiff was stopped at approximately 0213 hours, by defendant, Port St. Lucie, Police Officer, Worthington, and arrested and charged with

Driving under the Influence (DUI), by defendant, Port St. Lucie Police Officer, Harris.

2. On February 7, 2005, the Plaintiff appeared in open Court, before defendant, Judge, Phillip Yacucci, in pro-se. The Plaintiff's charge of DUI was dropped down to Reckless Driving, because Plaintiff filed a Motion to Suppress evidence, in case number 562004CT005567, and the Plaintiff blew under the state legal limit. The Plaintiff accepted a plea agreement from the state (defendant, State Attorney, Colton, who was represented by an unknown Assistant state Attorney), which was 6 months probation and it included the DUI to be dropped down to a lesser included offense, which was Reckless Driving.
3. Defendants: Joseph Smith, Officer, Harris, Officer, Worthington, Mascara, Yacucci, and Colton all committed treason, trespass, wrongful conviction, false imprisonment, fraud, slavery, incompetence, kidnapping, malicious prosecution, and etc., because none of these defendants had jurisdiction to move the case forward because Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11^{TH} Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was charged and convicted in the Improper Venue. Any one of the said jurisdictional grounds by itself would have gotten the Plaintiff's charges dismissed. Defendants: Officer, Harris, Officer, Worthington, Smith, Mascara, Yacucci, and Colton, knew better or should have known better then to convict the Plaintiff for DUI without having the jurisdiction to do so. Legal Maxim: "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." Officers of the court are presumed to know the law; therefore, the actions of the defendants were done willfully with total disregards towards Plaintiff's US Constitutional Rights and Human Rights.
4. Defendant, Colton, engaged in acts of prosecutorial misconduct, by and through his unknown Assistant State Attorney, when he helped to sentence the Plaintiff to 6 months probation and 50 hours of community Service, on February 7, 2005, in County Case Number 562004CT005567. Theses causes of action against the defendants is clear when considering the fact that Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11^{TH} Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was charged and tried in the Improper Venue. The State and the court never had the jurisdiction to move the case forward, based upon the said jurisdictional grounds, and defendant Colton either knew or should have known of the said jurisdictional grounds; therefore, defendant Colton is guilty of all causes of action, because he is an Officer of the Court and is presumed to know the law. Legal Maxim: "He who knows acts willfully."

5. Defendants Colton and Yacucci, as Members of the Florida Bar, violated their oaths (contracts) with defendant, Florida Bar (to uphold and defend the US and Florida Constitution), due to their actions and inactions; therefore, they breached their contracts with the Florida Bar when they violated the performance requirements of their Florida Bar Oaths, and violated The Rules of Professional Conduct, to maintain a level of competency. Defendants Colton and Yacucci even violated their duties to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.
6. Defendant, Florida Bar, is responsible for the actions and inactions of defendants, Colton and Yacucci, because they are or were members of the FL Bar. Defendants are or were licensed with defendant, Florida Bar; therefore, the FL Bar is responsible for their incompetence and US Constitutional Rights violations.
7. Defendants: Smith, Yacucci, Mascara, Colton, Officer Harris, and Officer Worthington, violated their Oaths of Office by failing to uphold and defend the US and Florida Constitution; therefore, a breach of contract occurred between the said defendants and the state, local, county governments, and the people that they swore an oath to protect and to serve. This is clearly manifest, due to their alleged actions and inactions which gave rise to causes of action and violations of Plaintiff's US Constitutional Rights.
8. Defendants: Port Saint Lucie PD, Mayor of Port Saint Lucie (2004-2005), Port Saint Lucie Police Chief (2004-2005), Port St. Lucie Board of City Commissioners (2004-2005), Saint Lucie Board of County Commissioners (2004-2005), Governor (2004-2005), Secretary of State (2004-2005), State of Florida, 19th Judicial circuit, Fort Pierce Board of City Commissioners (2004-2005), Florida Attorney General (2004-2005), Brue Colton, Ken Mascara, Florida Bar, Fort Pierce PD, Fort Pierce Police Chief (2004-2005), and Mayor of Fort Pierce (2004-2005), are/were all the chief policy makers, superiors, and/or employers of defendants: Officer, Harris, Officer, Worthington, Smith, Mascara, Yacucci, and Colton; therefore, they are all ultimately responsible for their actions and inactions, because they acted via powers given to them under the color of state law and local government.
9. Whereas, the above named defendants are all liable for all of the causes of action listed herein and US Constitutional Rights violations, via their agents, defendants: Officer, Harris, Officer, Worthington, Smith, Mascara, Yacucci, and Colton, who acted under the color of state law when they violated the defendants, their superiors, policies, customs, and/or practices that required them to uphold their Oath of Offices, to protect and defend the State and US Constitutions, as well as to protect and serve the people; however, it is evident that defendants: Officer, Harris, Officer, Worthington, Smith, Mascara, Yacucci, and Colton, violated the Plaintiff's rights in too many ways to count; thereby, making the said defendants and their superiors liable for their actions and inactions. If not for the defendants' unconstitutional acts

and inactions, the Plaintiff's reputation would have never been ruined because Plaintiff would have never been arrested and convicted of DUI.

10. The DUI caused Plaintiff to lose his driver's license for two years and pay a lot of money for tickets and fines associated with the DUI Convicted, which later came back to haunt the Plaintiff when he violated his 6 months probation that is associated with County Case Number 562004CT005567, with a new charge of driving while license suspended. (See County case number 2005CT002801). Plaintiff was sentenced to 90 days county Jail time due to his violation of probation, which could have been avoided if said defendants would have never violated the Plaintiff's US Constitutional Rights. I will discuss the said Suspended License case (2005CT002801) later as we read on.

(Note: this section of the Statements of the Case and Facts deals with County Case Number 2005CT002801.)

1. The Plaintiff violated his 6 months probation, in County Case Number, 562004CT005567, with a driving while license suspended, ticket, 9551DRF 6, which created County Case Number 2005CT002801. The Plaintiff was charged with this ticket on April 22, 2005, and arrested by a gang of Fort Pierce, Police Officers, Weed & seed Unit, and taken into custody by defendant, Sheriff, Mascara.
2. On July 25, 2005, the Plaintiff appeared in open court with court appointed counsel, Doreen Reagent, who was representing her boss, Defendant, Diamond Lilly, Public Defender, before defendant, Judge, Yacucci. Defendant, Colton, was being represented by an unknown female, Assistant State Attorney.
3. The Plaintiff accepted a plea agreement with the State for 90 days in the County Jail for the violation of Reckless Driving Probation in case number 562004CT005567, and 6 months probation for driving while license suspended in case number 2005CT002801. The sentences were run concurrent.
4. Defendants: Regent and/or Lilly was ineffective and incompetent for not challenging the jurisdiction of the state and the court when Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11^{TH} Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was convicted in the Improper Venue. If Regent and/or Lilly would have challenged the jurisdiction of the court and state, the Plaintiff would have never done 90 days in the county jail. Defendant Regeant and/or Lilly could have easily filed a motion to dismiss based on any of the jurisdictional grounds and got all charges dismissed against the Plaintiff.
5. Based upon the above claim of incompetence and ineffective assistance of counsel, it is very evident that defendants Regeant and/or Lilly, failed to provide the Plaintiff with the effective assistance of counsel, which is guaranteed by the 6^{th} Amendment

under the US Constitution, the 5th Amendment, Due Process and the 14th Amendment, Equal Protection; and the Plaintiff was clearly injured or suffered prejudice, because Plaintiff served a 90 day jail sentenced, as a result of their alleged unconstitutional actions and inactions.

6. Defendants: Joseph Smith, Mascara, Yacucci, Colton, Regeant, and Lilly all committed Conspiracy to Commit Racketing, treason, trespass, wrongful conviction, false imprisonment, fraud, slavery, incompetence, kidnapping, malicious prosecution, and etc., because none of these defendants had jurisdiction to move the case forward because Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11TH Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was charged and tried in the Improper Venue. Any one of the said jurisdictional grounds by itself would have gotten the Plaintiff's charges dismissed.
7. The defendants' criminal enterprise, defendant, 19th Judicial circuit, did extort a criminal conviction from the Plaintiff by means of threat, duress, and coercion; because due to the manpower of defendant, Sheriff Mascara, the Plaintiff felt like he didn't have a choice but to take the 90 days sentence. The defendants had a mutual agreement that they would extort a conviction and/or money from the Plaintiff regardless of his US constitutional rights, on July 25, 2005, which is very obvious considering the fact that defendants had no jurisdiction to arrest, detain, process, and convict the Plaintiff.
8. Defendants: Joseph Smith, Mascara, Yacucci, Colton, Regeant, and Lilly, knew better or should have known better then to convict the Plaintiff for Violation of Probation and Driving While License Suspended without having the jurisdiction to do so. Legal Maxim: "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." Officers of the court are presumed to know the law; therefore, the actions of the defendants were done willfully with total disregards towards Plaintiff's US Constitutional Rights and Human Rights.
9. Defendant, Colton, engaged in acts of prosecutorial misconduct, by and through his unknown Assistant State Attorney, when she helped to sentence the Plaintiff to 90 days in the County Jail, on July 25, 2005, in County Case Number 562004CT005567. This cause of action against the defendant, Colton, is clear when considering the fact that the defendant, 19th Judicial Circuit, never had any jurisdiction, because Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11TH Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was charged and convicted in the Improper Venue. The State and the court never had the jurisdiction to move the case forward, based upon the said jurisdictional grounds, and defendant Colton either knew or should have known of the said jurisdictional grounds; therefore, defendant Colton is guilty of

all causes of action, because he is an Officer of the Court and is presumed to know the law. Legal Maxim: "He who knows acts willfully."

10. Defendants: Colton, Yacucci, Lilly, and Regeant, as Members of the Florida Bar, violated their oaths with defendant, Florida Bar (to uphold and defend the US and Florida Constitutions), due to their actions and inactions; therefore, they breached their oaths (contracts) with the Florida Bar, and violated The Rules of Professional Conduct, to maintain a level of competency. Defendants: Colton, Yacucci, Lilly, and Regeant even violated their duties to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.
11. Defendant, Florida Bar, is responsible for the actions and inactions of defendants: Colton, Lilly, Yacucci, and Regeant, because they are or were members of the FL Bar. Defendants are or were licensed with defendant, Florida Bar; therefore, the FL Bar is responsible for their US Constitutional Rights violations.
12. Defendants: Smith, Yacucci, Mascara, Colton, Lilly, Officer Harris, and Officer Worthington, violated their Oaths of Office by failing to uphold and defend the US and Florida Constitutions; therefore, a breach of contract occurred between the said defendants and the state, local, county governments, and the people that they swore an oath to protect and to serve. This is clearly manifest, due to their alleged actions and inactions which gave rise to all of the causes of action and violations of Plaintiff's US Constitutional Rights.
13. Defendants: Port Saint Lucie PD, Mayor of Port Saint Lucie (2004-2005), Port Saint Lucie Police Chief (2004-2005), Port St. Lucie Board of City Commissioners (2004-2005), Saint Lucie Board of County Commissioners (2004-2005), Governor (2004-2005), Secretary of State (2004-2005), State of Florida, 19th Judicial circuit, Fort Pierce Board of City Commissioners (2004-2005), Florida Attorney General (2004-2005), Brue Colton, Ken Mascara, Florida Bar, Fort Pierce PD, Fort Pierce Police Chief (2004-2005), and Mayor of Fort Pierce (2004-2005), are/were all the chief policy makers, superiors, and/or employers of defendants: Regeant, Lilly, Smith, Officer Harris, Officer Worthington, Mascara, Yacucci, and Colton; therefore, they are all ultimately responsible for their actions and inactions, because they acted via powers given to them under the color of state law and local government.
14. Whereas, the above named defendants are all liable for all of the causes of action listed herein and US Constitutional Rights violations, via their agents, defendants: Regeant, Lilly, Smith, Mascara, Officer Harris, Officer Worthington, Yacucci, and Colton, who acted under the color of state law when they violated the defendants, their superiors, policies, customs, and/or practices that required them to uphold their Oath of Offices, to protect and defend the US and Florida Constitutions, as well as to protect and serve the people; however, it is evident that defendants: Regeant, Officer Harris, Officer Worthington, Lilly, Smith, Mascara, Yacucci, and Colton, violated the Plaintiff's rights in too many ways to count; thereby, making the said defendants and their superiors liable for their actions and inactions. If not for the defendants'

unconstitutional acts and inactions, the Plaintiff's reputation would have never been ruined, because Plaintiff would have never been convicted of DUI, nor served 90 days in the St. Lucie County Jail.

15. Altogether, the Plaintiff served 2,100 days behind bars, illegally. For example, 2,010 days in case number 98-823-CF, and 90 days in case number 562004CT005567, which equals 2,100 days of wrongful conviction, false arrest, false imprisonment, kidnapping, fraud, slavery, cruel and unusual punishment, loss of life, loss of wages, mental and emotional distress, and etc., altogether.
16. When the Plaintiff was illegally arrested and charged with various crimes, the State of Florida and the defendants committed a false arrest, kidnapping, Wrongful Conviction, false imprisonment, treason, slavery, racketeering, fraud, defamation of character, trespass; and gave rise to all of the causes of action complained of herein, in violated defendant's federally secured constitutional rights guaranteed by the 1st, 13th, 8th, 5th, 11th, 4th, 6th, and 14th Amendments under the US Constitution.
17. As a result of the Wrongful convictions and all of the causes of action, the Plaintiff lost some of the best years of his life, the right to vote and bare arms, and the potential for a great deal of money too, as well as a felony conviction that makes it almost impossible to get a job and it bars the defendant from certain jobs.
18. The fee for illegal incarceration in Florida is roughly around $200.00 US Dollars per day; that is once Writ of Habeas Corpus is filed and the state continues its illegal incarceration. If this is the case, the State of Florida, the corporation of Florida, owes the defendant $420,000 US Dollars. The plaintiff came to this conclusion by multiplying the total number of days he served behind bars with the going fee of $200.00 US dollars per day.
19. However, in 2008, the Florida Legislature passed the, "Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act," which set up a streamlined process to pay exonerees $50,000 per year for wrongful incarceration as well as provide them access to tuition-free education.
20. According to the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act, the State of Florida owes, the defendant $300,000 US dollars, for the 5 years and 10 months of illegal incarceration, which rounds out to 6 years, easily, when the 90 days the defendant spent in county jail, illegally, is added.

(Note: this section of the Statements of the Case and Facts deals with State Circuit Court Case Number 562007CF4217.)

1. On September 7, 2007, at approximately 0725 hours, the Plaintiff was allegedly stopped by defendant, Port Saint Lucie, Police Officer, Cotterman, for a traffic offense for failure to maintain single lane, and was charged with Habitual Traffic Offender, in State Circuit Court Case Number 562007CF4217.

2. The Plaintiff was arrested and taken to jail by defendant, Cotterman, processed and detained by defendant Mascara. Plaintiff bonded out about a week later.
3. Defendant, Assistant Public Defender, Charles Nervine, was assigned to the Plaintiff's case as a representative of defendant, Diamond Lilly, the Public Defender.
4. Defendants: Nervine and/or Lilly was ineffective and incompetent for not challenging the jurisdiction of the state and the court when Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11TH Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was convicted in the Improper Venue. If Nervine and/or Lilly would have challenged the jurisdiction of the court and state, the Plaintiff would have never had to go through the embarrassment and defamation of character that stemmed from being charged as a Habitual Traffic Offender; especially, after considering the fact Nervine and/or Lilly could have easily filed a motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional grounds and got all charges dismissed against the Plaintiff, very early in the case. In order to make matters worse, defendant Nervine filed continuance after continuance after the Plaintiff had filed a legally sufficient, very strong, Motion to Suppress evidence, in which Plaintiff asked defendant Nervine to either adopt his motion or file his own. Nervine filed several continuances as retaliation, because he felt the Plaintiff was taking credit for the case.
5. Based upon the above claim of incompetence and ineffective assistance of counsel, it is very evident that defendants Nervine and/or Lilly, failed to provide the Plaintiff with the effective assistance of counsel, which is guaranteed by the 6th Amendment under the US Constitution, the 5th Amendment, Due Process and the 14th Amendment, Equal Protection.
6. Judge Conner and defendant Nervine got into an argument because of Nervine asking for a continuance instead of adopting Plaintiff's Motion to Suppress. Judge Conner got so frustrated with Defendant Nervine and his continuance that he withdrew from the case and the case was reassigned to defendant, Judge, Schack.
7. On or around March-July of 2008, the Plaintiff went before defendant Schack. Plaintiff was represented by defendant Nervine. Defendant Colton, was represented by his Assistant State Attorney, Jeffrey Hendriks.
8. Defendant, Hendriks even got so frustrated with Nervine's game of filing continuance after continuance, that he dismissed his own case.
9. Defendants: Joseph Smith, Mascara, Officer Cotterman, Schack, Colton, Nervine, and Lilly all committed treason, trespass, wrongful conviction, false imprisonment, fraud, slavery, incompetence, kidnapping, malicious prosecution, and etc., because none of these defendants had jurisdiction to move the case forward because Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11TH Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced

all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was charged and convicted in the Improper Venue. Any one of the said jurisdictional grounds by itself would have gotten the Plaintiff's charges dismissed.

10. Defendants: Joseph Smith, Mascara, Officer Cotterman, Schack, Colton, Nervine, and Lilly, knew better or should have known better then to arrest and charge the Plaintiff as a Habitual Traffic Offender without having the jurisdiction to do so. Legal Maxim: "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." Officers of the court are presumed to know the law; therefore, the actions of the defendants were done willfully with total disregards towards Plaintiff's US Constitutional Rights and Human Rights.
11. Defendants, Colton and Hendriks engaged in acts of prosecutorial misconduct when they formally charged the Plaintiff as a Habitual Offender, on September 17, 2007. This cause of action against the defendants, Colton and Hendriks, is clear when considering the fact that the defendant, 19th Judicial Circuit, never had any jurisdiction, because Plaintiff is not a US Citizen; the court had no jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 11TH Amendment Immunity; Plaintiff was charged with violating Statutes when congress has replaced all statutes with International Law; state presented no holder-in-due-course and no corpus delicti; and the Plaintiff was charged and tried in the Improper Venue. The State and the court never had the jurisdiction to move the case forward, based upon the said jurisdictional grounds, and defendants Colton and Hendriks either knew or should have known of the said jurisdictional grounds; therefore, defendant Colton is guilty of all causes of action, because he is an Officer of the Court and is presumed to know the law. Legal Maxim: "He who knows acts willfully."
12. Defendants: Colton, Lilly, Schack, Nervine, and Hendriks, as Members of the Florida Bar, violated their oaths with defendant, Florida Bar (to uphold and defend the US and Florida Constitutions), due to their actions and inactions; therefore, they breached their contracts with the Florida Bar and the State of Florida when they violated the performance requirements of their Florida Bar Oaths and their Oaths of Office. Defendants Colton, Schack, Lilly, and Hendriks even violated their duties to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.
13. Defendant, Florida Bar, is responsible for the actions and inactions of defendants: Colton, Lilly, Schack, Nervine, and Hendriks, because they are members of the bar. Defendants are or were licensed with defendant, Florida Bar; therefore, the FL Bar is responsible for their US Constitutional violations.
14. Defendants: Port Saint Lucie PD, Mayor of Port Saint Lucie (2007-2008), Port Saint Lucie Police Chief (2007-2008), Port St. Lucie Board of City Commissioners (2007-2008), Saint Lucie Board of County Commissioners (2007-2008), Governor (2007-2008), Secretary of State (2007-2008), State of Florida, 19th Judicial circuit, Fort Pierce Board of City Commissioners (2007-2008), Florida Attorney General (2007-

2008), Brue Colton, Ken Mascara, Florida Bar, and Mayor of Fort Pierce (2007-2008), are/were all the chief policy makers, superiors, and/or employers of defendants: Nervine, Lilly, Smith, Mascara, Schack, Hendriks, Cotterman, and Colton; therefore, they are all ultimately responsible for their actions and inactions, because they acted via powers given to them under the color of state law and local government.

15. Whereas, the above named defendants are all liable for all of the causes of action listed herein and US Constitutional Rights violations, via their agents, defendants: Nervine, Lilly, Smith, Mascara, Schack, Hendriks, Cotterman, and Colton, who acted under the color of state law when they violated the defendants, their superiors, policies, customs, and/or practices that required them to uphold their Oath of Offices, to protect and defend the US and Florida Constitutions, as well as to protect and serve the people; however, it is evident that defendants: Nervine, Lilly, Smith, Mascara, Schack, Hendriks, Cotterman, and Colton violated the Plaintiff's rights in too many ways to count; thereby, making the said defendants and their superiors liable for their actions and inactions. If not for the defendants' unconstitutional acts and inactions, the Plaintiff would have never been arrested, detained, and charged as a Habitual Traffic Offender, which came with many of embarrassing court dates.

(Note: this section of the Statements of the Case and Facts deals with County Court Traffic Case Numbers 2007TR043182 A1 and 2007TR043187.)

1. Case numbers 2007TR043182 A1 and 2007TR043187 A1, are two traffic citations that charged Plaintiff as a defendant in 2007, in Saint Lucie County, FL. The Plaintiff received both traffic tickets at the same time by an unknown police officer. The alleged infractions occurred in Saint Lucie County, Florida.
2. The defendants: State of Florida, 19th Judicial Circuit, Mascara, and St. Lucie County Board of Commissioners, has no jurisdiction and the tickets, in fact, all of them must be dismissed and the Plaintiff must be compensated for them all.
3. The Plaintiff's Right to Travel on the public highway when not in commerce is a fundamental Constitutional Right protected by due process and equal protection. As long as there is no threat or harm to the public safety. The Plaintiff should have never been pulled over to begin with because there was no emergency and no flesh and blood victim for the state; therefore, there was no crime. The Plaintiff's 4th Amendment Rights under the US constitution were violated when the Plaintiff was stopped and illegal cited without there being a crime and without the state actor, the unknown Officer, having jurisdiction to do so.
4. The Plaintiff has suffered prejudice as a result of the tickets because they are on his record, they carry points, and Plaintiff was illegal taxed and/or fined.

(Note: this section of the Statements of the Case and Facts deals with County Court Case Number 2010MM001552.)

1. On April 23, 2010, the Plaintiff was a passenger traveling with a friend. Defendant, Officer Warner, Ft. Pierce, PD, stopped the driver for a traffic violation. Officer Warner had called for a K9 unit because driver threw out something before stopping.

2. Officer Warner had asked the driver for license and registration. Driver gave defendant, Officer Warner, what he requested. Warner told us not to move while he checks the information. The K9 unit arrives. The unknown officer walked the K9 around the vehicle three times and the dog scratched his paws on the passenger side of the vehicle as a signal. The unknown officer with the dog tells the Plaintiff to get out of the vehicle. Plaintiff got out the vehicle. K9 jumps in the vehicle and finds marijuana in the vehicle. The unknown officer asks the Plaintiff who owns it. The Plaintiff told the unknown officer that he doesn't know and that he had no knowledge it was there.

3. Defendant Warner gave the Plaintiff a Notice To Appear, which created County Case number 2010MM001552, a criminal misdemeanor for possession of Marijuana under 20 grams. The Plaintiff received time-served with no probation, in 2010, at Saint Lucie County, FL., courtroom.

4. The defendants: State of Florida, 19th Judicial Circuit, Colton, Officer Warner, Smith, Mascara, St. Lucie County Board of County Commissioners, and Fort Pierce Board of City Commissioners, Mayor of Fort Pierce, Governor of Florida, Florida Secretary of State, and Florida Attorney General, had no jurisdiction to move the case forward but yet Plaintiff was still wrongfully convicted by defendants under color of state law, in violation of US Constitutional Amendments, 4, 6, 1, 5, 14, 8, and 13.

5. The Plaintiff suffered prejudice as a result of this wrongful conviction because the charge remains on the Plaintiff's record and he was fined.

(Note: the section of the Statements of the Case and Facts deals with State Circuit Civil Case Number 11CA2316)

1. On August 26, 2011, the Plaintiff, Case number 11CA2316, filed an civil action against the state of Florida for birth certificate fraud and etc, because Plaintiff was sold into slavery/citizenship/state property/bondage, when the state of Florida issued a Birth Certificate in his former name EUGENE JAMES WILLIAMS, which pledged the Plaintiff as the security/collateral for the state and national debt. This was done unlawfully, because the Plaintiff was too young to consent to the issuance of the Birth Certificate and full disclosure was never given to his parents, the informants, and to the Plaintiff. The federal and state governments came up with the Birth Certificate fraud, the Birth certificate, in 1933 when this Country went bankrupt, because of the great depression. In order to make a long story short, the Governments created the Birth Certificate in order to pledge the labor and the potential labor of the people as security and/or collateral for any debt accumulated by the governments when they borrowed money from the Federal Reserve Bank.

2. As of right now, the bond that Plaintiff's Birth Certificate created is being traded on the New York Stock Exchange and it's worth Millions of Dollars.
3. As a result of the said fraud, the Birth Certificate, the State of Florida had the illusion of Personal Jurisdiction to prosecute the Plaintiff, EUGENE JAMES WILLIAMS, in L.T. case number 98-823-CF, and other cases too, because the birth Certificate established citizenship. If not for the fraud, the illegal contract, which is the Birth Certificate, the State of Florida would have never been able to prosecute the Plaintiff when he was the defendant in the said L.T. case number 98-823-CF and other cases as well; because the Plaintiff wouldn't be a subject, a citizen, of the State of Florida.
4. The State of Florida went into default on September 25, 2011, in L.T. Case number 11CA2316, which is 30 days after the Plaintiff in this case filed the action on August 26, 2011. The Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment, in State circuit court, on November 14, 2011. The Plaintiff never received a hearing for the said motion. The Plaintiff filed a First Amended Motion for Default Judgment, in state Circuit Court, on May 11, 2012. The Plaintiff has not received a hearing on this Motion and the judge, Dan Vaughn, has ignored all pleadings in the case file.

(Note: this section of the Statements of the Case and Facts deals with the events that stemmed from the Plaintiff's Affidavit in the nature of Writ of Error Coram Nobis.)

1. On April 17, 2012, the Plaintiff filed an Affidavit: In the nature of Writ of Error Coram Nobis, in the circuit court of the 19th Judicial Circuit, in the criminal and traffic division, State of Florida; along with an Affidavit of Nationality. The Plaintiff filed the said pleadings to correct the illegal null and void judgments of convictions that arose because the state of Florida lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction, improper venue, standing, no Corpus Delicti, no holder in due course, and etc., to try the Plaintiff on all criminal and traffic cases. (See the record of this court for further proof. It is marked as Exhibit A. It was filed with a Notice of removal, on June 6, 2012, by the Plaintiff, in Case Number 12-CV-14201-JEM. The evidence is named: Affidavit: In the Nature of Writ of Error Coram Nobis & a Demand for Dismissal or State the Proper Jurisdiction).
2. On May, 10, 2012, the Plaintiff received a back-dated unsigned court order from the 19th Judicial Circuit, which resulted in the Plaintiff filing a Motion to dismiss: Sham pleadings, a motion to consolidate, and First Amended Motion for Default Judgment, in state circuit court, on May 11, 2012. All of these said pleadings are public record in Case Number 12-CV-14201-JEM, filed with this court.
3. On May 18, 2012, the Plaintiff filed Petitioner's Motion for Default Judgment; because the 30 days Plaintiff gave the state of Florida to respond to his Affidavit/Writ of Error Coram Nobis had expired on May 17, 2012.
4. On May 21, 2012, at or around 1:30PM Eastern, the Plaintiff called Judge Dan Vaughn's Judicial Assistance, defendant, Alice Crump, in order to schedule a hearing for Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment that was filed, in state Circuit Court, on Friday, May 18, 2012. The Plaintiff requested to set the said motion for a hearing and defendant Crump told the Plaintiff that she didn't have the said motion yet and that she wasn't for sure if defendant, Judge Dan Vaughn was the Plaintiff's judge. The Plaintiff laughed and said, "Well.., since you don't have the default

motion yet, could you please set my motion to dismiss: sham pleadings that I filed, on May 11, 2012, for a hearing?" There was a moment of silence. Defendant Crump told the Plaintiff to hold on because she was looking and doesn't see it. So I said, "You mean to tell me that a motion that I filed on May 11, 2012, isn't on your docket yet? Someone had to pull my pleadings!" So defendant, Crump, told me to hold on! Wait a minute! Don't you go off assuming things! So I said in other words, you would too if you was on the other end of this phone conversation. There was then another moment of silence. Defendant Crump then told the Plaintiff that she sees the Plaintiff's Motion for Default and Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss: Sham pleadings and that they would have to review my pleadings first and she has to see if Dan Vaughn is Plaintiff's judge, so the Plaintiff laughed again. Defendant, Crump asked Plaintiff for a number to reach him at, so he gave her his phone number. Defendant Crump then told the Plaintiff in other words, that what they do around here is their bread and butter and that she was a part of everything and that I would have to fight all of them. However, no hearing was scheduled and it may never be scheduled at the circuit Court of the 19th Judicial Circuit.

5. The actions of defendant, Crump constitute a denial of access to the courts, suppression of evidence, and obstruction of justice, which is in violation of the 1st, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments under the US Constitution.
6. As a result of defendant Crump's, constitutional violation of access to the courts and criminal violations of Title 18 USC: obstructing justice and suppression of evidence, the Plaintiff has suffered prejudice/injury, because Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment was never scheduled for a hearing and may never be scheduled for a hearing, unless the Florida Supreme Court grant's Plaintiff's Writ of Mandamus filed against defendants: State of Florida, Smith, Vaughn, and Crump, on June 14, 2012. The Plaintiff filed the said mandamus with this court as an attachment to a Motion to Dismissed, filed on June 14, 2012.
7. On May 23, 2012 at or around 11:00AM, the Plaintiff called Alice Crump and told her don't worry about scheduling any hearings, because I was transferring the case to Federal Court.
8. On June 1, 2012, the Plaintiff received an order, dated May 23, 2012, from defendant, Judge, Dan Vaughn, striking Motion to Dismiss sham pleadings; Motion to consolidate; and Affidavit in the nature of Writ of Error Coram Nobis & a demand for dismissal or state the proper jurisdiction. The court struck all of the said pleadings without having the jurisdiction to do so, because jurisdiction was never proven on the record. The court committed treason when it done so, because the court lacks jurisdiction. "When a judge acts when he or she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason." (See US vs. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S. ct, 471, 66 L. Ed. 2nd 392, 406 (1980) Cohen vs. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6wheat) 264, 404 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821)).
9. Defendant Vaughn denied the Plaintiff access to the courts, obstructed justice, and suppressed evidence when he entered the said order striking Plaintiff's said pleadings, because Plaintiff was clearly entitled to relief. However, most importantly, defendant Vaughn committed trespass, treason, and fraud in violation of Title 18 USC, when he acted without jurisdiction when striking the Plaintiff's said pleadings.

10. The Plaintiff suffered prejudice/injury as a result of defendant Vaughn's actions, because the Plaintiff is waiting for relief when relief should have been granted months ago.
11. Defendants Colton, State of Florida, Florida Secretary of State, and Florida Attorney General are liable for upholding wrongful convictions that clearly should have been dismissed (based upon the sheer merits of Plaintiff's affidavit in the nature of writ of Error Coram Nobis), as soon as the copies that Plaintiff mailed to them hit their office desks; therefore, their incompetence and willfulness is evident. In fact, it's willful, because defendants are trying to avoid liability.
12. On June 2, 2012, the Plaintiff received an order, dated May 29, 2012, from defendant, Magistrate/T.H.O., denying motion for default judgment. The court denied the Plaintiff's motion for default judgment without cause and without having the jurisdiction to do so, which constitutes a denial of access to the courts, fraud, treason, trespass, obstructing justice, and etc.
13. The Plaintiff suffered prejudice as a result of defendant THO, because due to his denial, the Plaintiff's motion for default was denied by a traffic judge that had no subject matter jurisdiction over a pleading that was assigned to a State Circuit Judge. The denial of Plaintiff's said motion caused delay, and caused the relief the Plaintiff sought not to be forthcoming.
14. Defendants: Colton, THO, Vaughn, and Florida Attorney General, as Members of the Florida Bar, violated their oaths with defendant, Florida Bar, to uphold and/or defend the US and State Constitution, due to their actions and inactions; therefore, they breached their contracts with the Florida Bar and the State of Florida when they violated the performance requirements of their Florida Bar Oaths and their Oaths of Office. Defendants: Colton, THO, Vaughn, and the Florida Attorney General even violated their duties to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.
15. Defendant, Florida Bar, is responsible for the actions and inactions of defendants: Colton, THO, Vaughn, and Florida Attorney General, because they are members of the bar. Defendants are or were licensed with defendant, Florida Bar; therefore, the FL Bar is responsible for their US Constitutional violations.
16. Defendants: Saint Lucie Board of County Commissioners (2011-present), Governor (2011-present), Secretary of State (2011-present), State of Florida, 19th Judicial circuit, Fort Pierce Board of City Commissioners (2011-present), Florida Attorney General (2011-presnt), Bruce Colton, Ken Mascara, Florida Bar, and Mayor of Fort Pierce (2011-2012), are/were all the chief policy makers, superiors, and/or employers of defendants: Colton, THO, Vaughn, and Florida Attorney General; therefore, they are all ultimately responsible for their actions and inactions, because they acted via powers given to them under the color of state law and local government.
17. Whereas, the above named defendants are all liable for all of the causes of action listed herein and US Constitutional Rights violations, via their agents, defendants: Colton, THO, Vaughn, and Florida Attorney General, who acted under the color of state law when they violated the defendants, their superiors, policies, customs, and/or

practices that required them to uphold their Oath of Offices, to protect and defend the State and US Constitutions, as well as to protect and serve the people; however, it is evident that defendants: Colton, THO, Vaughn, and Florida Attorney General violated the Plaintiff's rights in too many ways to count; thereby, making the said defendants and their superiors liable for their actions and inactions. If not for the defendants' unlawful unconstitutional acts and inactions, the Plaintiff wouldn't be waiting for relief in state court proceedings that are already in default. The said defendants could have and should have dismissed all charges against the Plaintiff. The question I would like to ask the State of Florida is why all charges haven't been dismissed when it clearly is evident that the state has and had no jurisdiction to prosecute the Plaintiff?

18. On June 6, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a notice of removal/change of venue/motion to transfer (see the record of this court), in an attempt to remove the above-styled cause, because it's obvious that the 19th Judicial Circuit is a hostile environment and defendant Crump was obviously giving Plaintiff the run-around and a hard time about scheduling any hearings, and the way she talked to the Plaintiff has a lot to do with the attempted transfer/removal.

19. On June 14, 2005, the Plaintiff elected to dismiss this case without prejudice due to the fact that he decided to go with a writ of Mandamus to the Florida Supreme Court, because he felt like it would be a lot faster, and Plaintiff had filed a very strong Mandamus, so he feels very confident about its success, if law is practiced.
20. Now, the Plaintiff files this action with the court to seek justice and show this court that Plaintiff is willing to go all the way with this action, which builds upon the Affidavit in the nature of Writ of Error Coram Nobis that Plaintiff filed as Exhibit A with this court, on June 6, 2012; and at the same time this action gives this court a clearer statements of the Case and facts. This action makes everything an official federal complaint that alleges violations of federal laws and US Constitutional Rights that caused injury and/or prejudice.
21. This is not an attack on an ongoing criminal action, because that's already in default. Due to default, the Plaintiff has; technically, already won. It's just a matter of getting the Florida Supreme Court to order the State of Florida to execute judgment. This foregoing action is separate from Plaintiff's ongoing state criminal action, and even if it wasn't Plaintiff's claims have already been exhausted in state court. Plaintiff has filed a 3.850, 3.800, Direct Appeal of Rule 3.800 motion to correct sentence, and a gang of affidavits and motions that proves Plaintiff has exhausted his claims in state court. All evidence is public record and can be easily accessed with Plaintiff's former name Eugene James Williams and with the state case numbers that have been provided in this action.

(Note: This section of the Statements of the Case and Facts deals with Embezzlement and the class as a whole.)

In order to fully explain the charges of embezzlement I will have to explain the US bankruptcy of 1933.

1. State of Emergency Senate Report 93-549

Since March 9, 1933, the United States has been in a state of declared national emergency. In fact, there are now in effect four presidentially proclaimed states of national emergency: In addition to the national emergency declared by President Roosevelt in 1933, there are also the national emergency proclaimed by President Truman on December 16, 1950, during the Korean conflict, and the states of national emergency declared by President Nixon on March 23, 1970, and August 15, 1971, President Bush and now President Obama.

2. Presidential proclaimed of any State of Emergency is basis on the 1917 Trading With the Enemy Act-itself a wartime delegation of power. The Trading With the Enemy Act had, however, been specifically designed by its originators to meet only wartime exigencies or State of Emergency.

3. Presidents have exercised numerous powers-most notably under the Trading With the Enemy Act-legitimated by that ongoing National Emergency. Hundreds of others have lain fallow, there to be exercised at any time, requiring only an order from the President.

4. Most of the statutes pertaining to emergency powers were passed in times of extreme crisis. Bills drafted in the Executive branch were sent to Congress by the President and, in the case of the most significant laws that ate on the books, were approved with only the most perfunctory committee review and virtually no consideration of their effect on civil liberties or the delicate structure of the U.S. Government of divided powers.

5. Such Congressional Acts as Public Law 1 ,48 stat C 1 (H.R. 1491) and Public Law 73-10 40 stat 411 Trading with the Enemy Act (H.R. 4960) AND public Law 10 ch 48 ,48 stat,112 (HJR 192) Hold Members of the Congress as official trustees over the greatest reorganization of any Bankrupt entity in world history, the U.S. Government.

6. The State of Florida is using the credit of the plaintiffs as the means of operating this state as the Federal Reserve Notes are not backed by so much as a penny worth of gold but is internal currency. (Pursuant to Congressional Documents of 1933).

7. Defendants have knowingly violate their Fiduciary Trustee position of the State of Emergency 12 USC 95b (Public Law 73-10 40 stat 411) by failing to discharge the public debt in the name of the people of the state of Florida. (Per 18 USC section 8 & 12 USC 411) For example, all money collected from the public by the defendants must be reported to the IRS and used to discharge the public and national debt. The defendants are pocketing the public's money for their own personal gain. This is clear embezzlement and fraud.

8. It is an established fact that the United States Federal Government has been dissolved by the Emergency Banking Act, March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1, Public Law 89-719; declared by President Roosevelt, being bankrupt and insolvent. H.J.R. 192, 73rd Congress in session June 5, 1933 -

Joint Resolution To Suspend The Gold Standard and Abrogate The Gold Clause dissolved the Sovereign Authority of the United States and the official capacities of all United States Governmental Offices, Officers, and Departments and is further evidence that the United States Federal Government exists today in name only.

9. The defendants are aware of both the 1913 Federal Reserve Act that was Congressionally mandated, and that the Federal Reserve Note that was created from this Act, as they are in use today as the coin of the realm, and that the1933 State of Emergency that was also mandated by Congress. The defendants should also know that they were required to pay the Public Debt once they receive the signed signature of this party. The defendants also know fully well it was living people whom they collected money from while engaged in commerce as public officials. They also know that the signature of the plaintiffs, the people, was the "collateral" under the Congressional mandate per Public Law and Congressional records.

10. Therefore, the defendants have violated sections of 18 USC, specifically, 472 - Uttering Counterfeit Obligations Or Securities, 473 - Dealing In Counterfeit Obligations Or Securities, And 474 - Plates, Stones, Or Analog, Digital, Or Electronic Images For Counterfeiting Obligations Or Securities. The defendants are the ones that, once they received the signed signatures from the plaintiffs, know of the violations mentioned and from where all the credit is derived...The People. These State, County, and Municipal government employees, officials or private contractors, Banks, Credit Card Companies, etc., are required to pay the Public Debt under the 1913 Federal Reserve Act that was Congressionally mandated and that the Federal Reserve Note was created from this Act as they are in use today as the "coin of the realm" in conjunction with the1933 State of Emergency Act.

11. The plaintiffs have suffered prejudice as a result of the defendants' embezzlement of plaintiffs' money because millions of dollars have been pocketed by the defendants when the money should have been used to discharge the public debt. It's probably billions, considering the fact that the state of Florida, as a whole, generates a lot of money from contracts signed by the plaintiffs, the people of the state. A state wide audit of all Florida courts, city and county governments in the state, as well as the records of the secretary of State and the State Treasury is warranted in order to determine the amount of amount that was embezzled and wasn't used to discharge the public debt.

12. According to the Highway Safety Act, 23 CFR 1250.2, the political subdivision is supposed to get 40% of all federal funding for the Highway Safety Program. The plaintiff's political subdivisions, their counties, are not getting the 40% of the federal funding, because the defendants have been embezzling the federal funding. The embezzlement is clear when you consider the condition of the counties throughout the state of Florida.

13. The plaintiffs have suffered prejudice as a result of the defendants' embezzlement of the plaintiffs' 40%, because their counties are not what they should be. The counties should have better roads, more schools, and more public officials to ensure effective operation and security.

RELIEF SOUGHT

1. Order the defendants to pay the Plaintiff 12 million, tax free, US dollars for compensatory damages.
2. Order the defendants to pay the plaintiff 12 million, tax free, US dollars for punitive damages, because the defendant's actions were clearly willful, and an example needs to be made out of public officials, who are presumed to know the law, who willfully violate another's human and constitutional rights.
3. The Plaintiff respectfully request this honorable court to issue its own Writ of Coram Error Nobis against the state of Florida, because the state needs help granting the relief the Plaintiff asked for in his own Affidavit in the nature of Writ of Error Coram Nobis, which is already in default in State Circuit Court.
4. Order the governor to grant the Plaintiff a full pardon for all criminal and traffic cases.
5. Issue an injunction, injunctive relief, against the state of Florida, to require the victim, the corpus delicti (flesh and blood victim) to sign a contract with the State Attorney or assistant, giving them power of attorney to represent the victim. Also require the living corpus delicti to sign the state information and appear in person at every court date just like the defendant has to appear. This injunction is good public policy because it will stop some of the corruption by the 19th Judicial Circuit. Someone or something needs to put the brakes on the defendant's criminal enterprise. Granting this injunction will surely lessen the corruption by the state of Florida. The people of Florida deserve this.
6. Order the US Attorney to file criminal charges against the defendants for the criminal causes of actions that was violated in this complaint: treason, trespass, fraud, kidnapping, obstructing justice, false imprisonment, slavery, conspiracy to commit racketeering, and etc., or allow the plaintiffs to proceed with criminal prosecutions.
7. Order a federal investigation, and/or state wide audit to determine how much money was embezzled from the plaintiffs by the defendants via plaintiffs' signatures on contracts. Order the defendants to pay for this.
8. Order the defendants to report all future money taken from the plaintiffs to the IRS so that funds can be used to discharge the public debt.
9. Order defendants to repay all embezzled money to the IRS so that it can be used to discharge the public debt.
10. Order the defendants to give plaintiffs their 40% of the federal funding for their political subdivisions.
11. The plaintiff requests a finder's fee from the US Government/IRS.
12. Order the defendants to pay for all filing fees, court fees, and attorney fees associated with this action.

Respectfully Submitted
by: _____
Secured Party Creditor/Authorized Representative
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U.C.C. 1-207/1-308, U.C.C. 1-103.
Amunhotep El Bey, plaintiffs
1230 Avenue I
Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.

Signed on this ____ day of _____ 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing compliant was served by method of service, on _____, on all parties of record in the Service List below:

Respectfully Submitted
by:_____
Secured Party Creditor/Authorized Representative
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U.C.C. 1-207/1-308, U.C.C. 1-103.
Amunhotep El Bey, Plaintiffs
1230 Avenue I
Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.

SERVICE LIST

1. Florida Attorney General, the Capitol PL-01., Tallahassee, FL. 32399-1050.
2. Florida Secretary of State, R. A. Gary Building, 500 S. Bronough, Tallahassee, FL. 32399-0250.
3. The Governor of Florida, 400 S. Monroe St., Tallahassee, FL. 32399.
4. The State of Florida, 400 S. Monroe St., Tallahassee, FL. 32399.
5. The Florida Bar, 651 E. Jefferson St., Tallahassee, FL. 32399-2300.
6. Joseph Smith, Clerk of the Circuit Court, P.O. Box 700, Fort Pierce, FL. 34954.
7. Joanne Holman, Clerk of the Circuit Court, P.O. Box 700, Fort Pierce, FL. 34954.
8. The 19th Judicial Circuit, 218 S. 2nd St., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
9. Michael Kessler, 101 N. U.S. 1., Suite 210., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
10. Steven J. Levin, 218 S. 2nd St., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
11. Dwight Geiger, 218 S. 2nd St., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
12. Dan Vaughn, 218 S. 2nd St., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
13. Alice Crump, 218 S. 2nd St., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
14. Larry Schack, 218 S. 2nd St., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
15. Philip J. Yacucci, 218 S. 2nd St., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
16. Diamond R. Lilly, 216 S. 2nd St., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
17. Doreen Regeant, 216 S. 2nd St., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
18. Charles A. Nervine, 216 S. 2nd St., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
19. Bruce H. Colton, 411 S. 2nd St., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
20. Jeffrey Hendriks, 411 S. 2nd St., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
21. Leatha Mullins, 309 Orange Avenue, Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
22. Officer Chico, Fort Pierce Police Department, 920 S. U.S. 1., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
23. Officer Warner, Fort Pierce Police Department, 920 S. U.S. 1., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
24. Fort Pierce Police Department, 920 S. U.S. 1., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
25. Police Chief, Fort Pierce Police Department, 920 S. U.S. 1., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
26. Mayor of Fort Pierce, City Hall, 100 N. U.S. 1., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.
27. Fort Pierce Board of City Commissioners, City Hall, 100 N. U.S. 1., Fort Pierce, FL. 34950.

28. Saint Lucie County Board of County Commissioners, 2300 Virginia Avenue, Fort Pierce, FL. 34982.
29. Bobby Knowles, 4700 W. Midway Road, Fort Pierce, FL. 34981.
30. Ken Mascara, 4700 W. Midway Road, Fort Pierce, FL. 34981.
31. Officer Harris, Port Saint Lucie Police Department, Building C, 121 S.W. Port Saint Lucie Blvd, Port Saint Lucie, FL. 34984.
32. Port saint Lucie Police Department, Building C, 121 S.W. Port Saint Lucie Blvd, Port Saint Lucie, FL. 34984.
33. Police Chief, Port saint Lucie Police Department, Building C, 121 S.W. Port Saint Lucie Blvd, Port Saint Lucie, FL. 34984.
34. Wade Willnow, Port saint Lucie Police Department, Building C, 121 S.W. Port Saint Lucie Blvd, Port Saint Lucie, FL. 34984.
35. Officer Worthington, Port saint Lucie Police Department, Building C, 121 S.W. Port Saint Lucie Blvd, Port Saint Lucie, FL. 34984.
36. Officer Cotterman, Port saint Lucie Police Department, Building C, 121 S.W. Port Saint Lucie Blvd, Port Saint Lucie, FL. 34984.
37. Mayor of Port Saint Lucie, City of Port Saint Lucie, City Hall, 121 S.W. Port Saint Lucie Blvd, Port Saint Lucie, FL. 34984-5099.
38. Port Saint Lucie City Commissioners, City of Port Saint Lucie, City Hall, 121 S.W. Port Saint Lucie Blvd, Port Saint Lucie, FL. 34984-5099.
39. Magistrate Judge/T.H.O., Saint Lucie County Annex, 250 N.W. Country Club Drive, Port Saint Lucie, FL. 34986.
40. Tracey Nemerofsky, 1111 Hypoluxo Road, suite 107, Lantana, FL. 34950.